1: Hoebel E-5 (1933) 1940 NO6 Comanche NO6

rather in situations where the problem was a question of what *ought* to be done that the peace chief was important. Because of his qualifications he was reputed to have the finest sense of social fitness. From this he derived a certain authority as counsellor-to-the-people-at-large. In some divorce situations he seems to have acted as arbiter and advisor. "Most likely some old man came in as advisor," though he was seldom active in this capacity. More typically, in the disposal of the huge herd of horses of the deceased Big Fall By Tripping the chief is said to have told the widow what to do.[1] That she followed his words means no more than that his ideas appealed to her as right and proper. It means no more than that his words, tailored in wisdom to the situation, appealed to her as they would likely have appealed to anyone. Under no circumstances had a peace chief the power to *order* an adjustment to be made.

It was not unusual for a "big" peace chief to have his personal herald, or announcer. In such an event, this individual served as the chief's mouthpiece in announcing the daily news and comments of the chief. Among the Comanches the chief's announcer was called ʧékwɔnit, which is the equivalent of the Northern Shoshone ʧégwɔni, peace chief. The Shoshone title for the chief's announcer is ʧégwɔniwʌp, meaning "he who specializes in speaking." "Anything the chief says, he tells them."

According to one of Dr. Mirsky's informants, a peace chief always had two young men to serve him as aides-de-camp. "They go with him because the right kind of a chief is loved by all." These young men protected their chief at all hazards; they would give their lives to take his body from the the enemy, and it was a thing to boast of to have been chosen as body guard to a peace chief.[2]

The influence of the peace chief was limited to internal and civil matters only. No peace chief could stop a war party from taking the trail. Peace-making was the prerogative of war leaders. Though peace chiefs were usually too old to participate in active combat, they were subject to the leadership of the war chiefs in case of attack upon the band.

While it was not necessary for a man to have a war record to become a peace chief, it was not uncommon for a war leader to achieve that rank in his later years. Such was the Comanche, Red Sleeve, "a *real* war leader, also a peace chief." Of the two sons of Red Sleeve, That's It spoke with tender sentiment of Two Mountains, peace chief of the Water Horse band, "a fine, gentle fellow never looking for trouble; whatever they did, he was the

[1] See p. 124.

[2] Jeannette Mirsky, *Comanche Field Notes*, unpublished.

1: Hoebel E-5 (1933) 1940 NO6 Comanche NO6

to be the way it was done, though no case describing such a situation was collected. 558

A war chief whose nerve failed him in a dangerous position *could* retreat—by giving up his right to wear the bonnet. He could cast it off and flee for his life. But he was a man without status thenceforth, for he could never again regain the bonnet and its rank. Life certainly would have been miserable from that point onward. Men hailed him as "elder sister."[15]

But what a chance this disaster opened for an ambitious brave to gain the war leader's status in one stride! He could dash into the danger spot to pick up the abandoned hat with his spear or bow. Turning his horse, he would bring it back and put it on a pole behind his lines. If the fight still continued when the sun was about to set, he then went to the pole and put on the hat. Thus arrayed he charged the enemy four times and struck an adversary on each foray. If he was successful in this and came through alive, the hat was his with all the privileges, honors, obligations and dangerous duties which went with it. This was the practice in the Those Who Move Often and Antelope bands. The lower rank war bonnet could be picked up by any one who saw it and was willing to assume the obligations adhering thereto. For it, the use of the bow or spear was not necessary, according to Becomes A Middle-Aged Man.[16] 555 726

PEACEMAKING

The waging of war was a matter of individual initiative, but the making of peace was a prerogative only in the hands of the war chiefs. A war leader on a raid could make peace in behalf of his own raiding party on his own authority. Such a peace, however, had no binding effect upon other members of the band and not at all upon the tribe. Band peace was made only upon unanimous consent of the warrior class, i.e., the meeting of the tɛ́kniwʌpnə. The historical making of peace with the Kiowas has been noted on page 12. All Comanche bands agreed to this with the result that it has remained unbroken since 1790. A permanent peace with the Cheyenne was effected in 1840.[17] 728 624

Relations with other tribes were more in the nature of truces than peace,

[15] According to a generalized observation by Neighbors (*The Comanches*, p. 130): "He is deprived of his office by any misfortune, such as loss of many men in battle, or even a single defeat, or being taken prisoner, but never for any private act unconnected with the welfare of the whole tribe." It is not so much that he was deprived of his office, as that he no longer could gain a following.

[16] The above rules are formulated principles for which no histories in action were obtainable.

[17] The Comanche version of the details of this occasion is lost. Its setting in the Cheyenne picture will be included in the author's forthcoming study of Cheyenne Law-ways.

1: Hoebel E-5 (1933) 1940 NO6 Comanche NO6

728 624 however. A good example at once of the role of intermarriage and of the power of the war leaders is found in the story of a Ute-Comanche peace which was engineered by a woman.

Case 3. Peacemaking With the Utes
Informant: That's It

"A Ute woman who had been captured by the Comanches was with a band who were fighting the Utes. Her son was a Comanche brave and she feared for his life. Finally she rode out between the fighters and held up her hand calling for them to stop. She said she was on both sides; she a Ute, her son a Comanche; it was not good for them to fight.

"A Ute chief rode up. The woman wanted to shake hands, but he said, 'No, not until I know if your chiefs sent you.' At this time her son rode up. He was a Comanche war chief. He said he was willing for peace, and he got the others to agree.

"They stopped fighting, and the Utes camped on one side of a hill and the Comanches on the other side. That day some Comanche hunters were coming back to camp and they didn't know about the truce. On the way they killed and scalped a Ute and felt pretty good about it. They were expecting the Comanche camp to be at that hill so they rode into the Ute camp by mistake, singing the Victory Song and swinging the scalp. But the chief of the Utes wasn't mad. He said, 'That's all right. We are at peace and you did not know it. We do not get mad.' Then the Comanches went over the hill and found their own camp.

"That night the leader of the Comanches went over to the Ute camp. He told them that since a Comanche was killed in the first attack, things were even and there shouldn't be any trouble.

"After that a council of ten Ute chiefs called at the Comanche camp to visit the Ute woman. They discovered that she was the sister of one of the ten chiefs. They made her a special honor; they took her back to the main Ute camp where her father and mother were still living. They gave her a tipi with an antelope skin tied to the top of a pole for a special sign.

"Later on there was trouble again and they had more fighting with the Utes."

2: Lee T-5 (1855-1858) 1957
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oooobered by the reader that I have now brought down this narrative to the month of May last, wherefore the object of the journey upon which the Indian chief, at this point, is ready to depart, and which I gathered, both from himself and various other sources, may be regarded in many quarters as exceedingly important.

● 728 648 His destination was a village three days' journey to the north. At this place a general convention had been called, to be composed of all the chiefs of all the different tribes inhabitating the country between the northern bounds of Mexico and the regions of perpetual snow. The object of the convention was to induce the Indian nations, hitherto at variance, to bury the hatchet as between themselves, smoke the peace pipe, and unite in a universal bond of brotherhood, for the purpose of preventing the whites from passing through their territories to the settlements on the Pacific Coast.

It was, as I then understood it, and now believe, to enter into an alliance with the view of waging an exterminating and implacable war upon every train of emigrants or other party moving towards California, Oregon, the Great Salt Lake, or other points in either of those directions. How it terminated, circumstances unanticipated but of a most exciting and stirring character forbid my knowing, yet, that the design was precisely such as I have mentioned is a fact, which I beg all those who contemplate making the overland route to bear seriously in mind.

292 The Rolling Thunder, before taking his departure, arrayed himself with extraordinary care. A dozen scalps were attached to his war shirt; silver trinkets representing the moon in all its phases were fastened on his breast; his feet were clad in new and cunningly embroidered moccasins, and on his head rested a crown of feathers plucked from

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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not ride a single one, but had to travel sitting on a travois. In comparison, the entire Pawnee tribe had 1,400, the Osage 1,200, and the Omaha 1,200. The greater the distance from Texas and Mexico, the fewer the horses found.

The number of horses possessed by the South Plains Indians decreased rapidly in the last half of the nineteenth century. The Antelope band surrendered only 1,500 head to the United States at the time of their capitulation at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, on June 2, 1875.[11] The Comanche, Kiowa, Apache, and Delaware tribes had 14,810 head in 1874, but three years later they possessed only 4,194. Subsequent to just one engagement, on the morning of September 28, 1874, the day after he had destroyed the Comanche-Kiowa-Cheyenne camp in Palo Duro Canyon, Colonel MacKenzie's troop shot and killed some 1,400 Indian horses.[12] Such attrition devastated the great herds.

The Comanches obtained their supply of horses by gift and trade, by breeding, by capturing wild ones, and by raiding.

It was considered a gracious gesture to give a favorite horse to a friend. And although it was general practice to kill a warrior's personal riding string on his grave, many a man before his death willed his favorite horse to his best friend. Even the poorest had at least one horse, for the public approved the rich man who celebrated an important occasion by giving a horse to some poor old fellow who could not rustle one for himself.

In intertribal trading the Comanches exchanged horses for goods, but by 1850 they had so many horses themselves that they never bothered to trade for them. In the great peace-making in 1840 between the Cheyennes on the one side and the Comanches, Kiowas, and Kiowa-Apaches on the other, the Cheyennes gave guns, blankets, calico, beads, and brass kettles, while the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches offered horses. Mountain, the Kiowa spokesman, had said, "We all of us have many horses; as many as we need; we do not wish to accept any horses as presents, but we shall be glad to accept any other gifts. We, the Kiowas, Comanches, and Apaches, have made a road to give many horses to you when we come here." They were as good as his word; every Cheyenne man, woman, and child

[11] Commissioner of Indian Affairs, *Annual Report*, 1875, 273.
[12] Nye, *Carbine and Lance*, 223.

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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received at least one horse. Some unimportant people got as many as five or six, and the Cheyenne chiefs many more.[13] 728

The numerous wild herds which roamed the Southern Plains afforded an ever ready supply to any Comanches who could take them—frequently a difficult task. The mustang, which played an important part in Comanche culture, was peculiarly fitted for its role. Small, agile, and tough, it was capable of surprising speed and possessed of great endurance. Its small, pointed, alert ears and quick, wicked eyes often signalled approaching danger before the rider himself was aware of it. The mustang was also a good forager and could obtain his own food even in the winter, when he was forced to live on bark and twigs. His life was in a way as hard and unadorned as that of the Indians. The frugal, wiry little creature became the fitting symbol of the equally frugal cultures of the Plains Indians. 224

The Comanches resorted to several methods of capturing wild mustangs. One necessitated building a corral, usually near or around a water hole, with diverging wings. The unsuspecting animals were driven between the wings until they entered the pen and were trapped. The Kiowas used this method extensively; the Comanches only occasionally. The Spaniards also used the plan, but it was so similar to the old Indian method of impounding antelope that it is probably an Indian adaptation of an old way to a new situation. In 1852 the Comanches were using "corrals into which four hundred or five hundred head could be driven."[14] Fortunately, a good description of such a corral in use before 1836 has survived. The corral was situated in an opening in blackjack timber. It was oval in shape, the opening being at one end. The fence was a stockade formed of blackjack posts set close together on end with brush and limbs of trees piled against the outside of the fence. The wings, made of brush, were heaped up high and wide, so that a horse could neither see through nor jump over them.[15] Once inside the pen, the mustangs were prisoners.

After the introduction of firearms, wild horses were often captured by "creasing"—a delicate task requiring expert marksmanship. To crease a horse was to shoot it through the muscular part of the

[13] G. B. Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 63–66.

[14] Anon., "Reminiscences of Service among the Comanches," *Frank Leslie's Popular Monthly*, June, 1882, 662–63.

[15] G. B. Grinnell, *The Cheyenne Indians*, I, 292.

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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The Comanches

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« « « This *pukutsi* was going through the camp, singing as usual.

An old woman stopped him and said, "*Pukutsi,* I want you to kill me a buffalo. I need the hide to use for my saddle; I have no boys to get one for me."

He went and was gone from the camp for a long time. Finally he came back at night with the whole skin of a Pawnee, even with hands and feet still on it, and he hung it up like a man standing there against her arbor.

Some man saw it there and called in to her in her lodge, "That *pukutsi* is back. Your hide is out here on the arbor."

Early in the morning she got up and went out to get it. That human skin frightened her. Then that man came by and told her she should not have asked a *pukutsi* to do such a job. "He is afraid of nothing."

"Well, I didn't ask him to bring me an enemy," she complained. But that's the way it is with *pukutsi.* You ask them to do one thing and they do just the opposite.

When she got over her first scare, the old woman jumped up and down and sang. She had an enemy scalp, which she kept. » » »

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The waging of war was a matter of individual initiative, but the making of peace was a matter for the chiefs. A war leader on a raid could make peace in behalf of his own party on his own authority, but such a peace was not binding upon other members of the band or upon the tribe. Band peace was made only upon consent of the war leaders, the council of elders, and the head chief. Tribal peace could be attained only when agreed upon and recognized by all the bands.

For all their devotion to war, the Comanches accepted the fact that a people cannot fight everybody on all fronts at once. The home base had to afford some measure of security for hunting and everyday living. Thus the Comanches worked out a sort of national policy of defensive alliances with their more powerful neighbors to their north, keeping their southern, western, and eastern frontiers open for far-ranging aggressive action.

Peace with the Kiowas was cemented in 1790 through the good offices of a mutual Spanish friend.[29] No details of this step are known,

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but it established a co-operative alliance that grew into the firmest of intertribal friendships, unbroken to this very day.

The Kiowas and Comanches together achieved peace with the Cheyennes in 1840. The details of the steps leading up to this agreement have, from the Cheyenne side of the picture, been recorded by Grinnell[30] and analyzed by Llewellyn and Hoebel.[31] Earlier in this book we described the gift exchanges that signalized the binding of the peace. From 1840 on, there were no disturbances between the Comanches and Cheyennes, although between these tribes there never developed the close symbiotic relations that characterized the Comanche-Kiowa ties.

Back to back, territorially speaking, the Southern Cheyenne, Kiowa, and Comanche combine formed a hard, solid core of security from which each tribe could push its warlike activities against outsiders.

There do not seem to be any accounts or memories of how the Comanches established peaceful relations with their eastern neighbors, the Wichitas. Perhaps they never regarded these people as objects of aggression.

Sporadic and limited peace gestures were made toward the Utes and Apaches in later years. They were never the consequence of a national policy but rather of individual motivations, as the following accounts indicate.

« « « Once there were a bunch of Comanches out looking for trouble. They came upon a bunch of Utes and started a fight.

There was a captive Ute woman with the Comanches whose son was a Comanche warrior. Because she got scared for her son's safety, she rode out between the fighters, holding up her hands and calling for them to stop.

"I am on both sides," she cried. "I am a Ute. My son is a Comanche. I don't want my kinspeople to be killing each other."

One of the Ute chiefs rode up to her. The woman held out her hand, but the Ute chief would not accept it.

[29] Mooney, "Calendar History of the Kiowa," *loc. cit.*, 162–65.

[30] Grinnell, *The Fighting Cheyennes*, 60–66.

[31] Llewellyn and Hoebel, *op. cit.*, 91–94.

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He said, "No, not until I know if your chiefs have sent you."

Then her son, who was a war chief, rode up. He was willing that they should stop fighting. And so a truce was made.

The two bands went into camp, the Utes on one side of a hill, the Comanches on the other.

Some Comanche hunters returning to their camp did not know about the truce. They came upon a Ute, whom they killed and scalped. Then they went right on into the Ute camp by mistake, singing the Victory Song and carrying his scalp.

The chief of the Utes calmed his people. "This is a mistake," he told them. "It is all right. We are at peace. We shall not get mad about this thing."

So the Comanche hunters went back and found their own camp.

When he heard the news, a Comanche chief went over to see the Utes. "This was a mistake," he told them. "However, it is not necessary to do anything about it. One of our men was killed in that battle we were having. Things are now even."

The Utes agreed.

The next day a council of ten Ute chiefs came to the Comanche camp to visit the Ute woman, and they found that she was a sister to one of them. They took her and her family back to the Ute camp to visit her parents, who were still living. There they gave her a special tipi with an antelope skin tied to a pole as a special sign.

At the end of four days, the Utes said, "Four days are now up. Now we shall separate."

The Utes wanted the Ute woman's son to stay with them. At first he refused, staying alone when the camps moved, to decide what to do. Finally, he took the Ute trail.

He came to the Ute camp and asked for their chief. The chief invited him to dismount, and told his wife to serve him a supper. The Comanche captive, his mother, was sent for to interpret. He told the chief of his desire to become a Ute.

This chief replied, "All right, you can be my son. But these Utes are bad. They might kill you sometime."

The Ute chief made him his son, and he named him *Wasape Sɜmanetɛ*. After a while the chief gave him a pack horse and sent him back to the Comanches.

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Our people renamed him *Patuwa Samono*, Ten Bears.[32] » » » 728 ● 648

Greyfoot added a poignant scrap of detail as an epilogue to this account. The son of the Ute chief was dying of an incurable illness. He was not old enough to go to war, but his father wanted him to die the glorious death of a warrior. He did not want to see him waste away to nothing.

Acceding to the chieftain's wish, Ten Bears and a friend dressed in their war regalia, ready to meet the enemy. The sickly boy was dressed for war. In a pantomime of battle Ten Bears and his friend killed him. The Ute chief, in thanks for honoring his son, gave the boy's horse and clothing to them. That was when Ten Bears returned to the Comanches.

Except for the Kiowa and Cheyenne relations, Comanche peace pacts were touch and go. The temporary Ute peace could have been destroyed in the making by the Comanche hunters' killing the Ute had not the Ute chief been a man of power and forbearance. The delicate nature of such negotiations and the low level of mutual trust is revealed in Slope's account of a Tonkawa peace overture.

« « « A Comanche girl had died. Her mother wanted to leave the tribe so that she would see no more Comanche girls. There were only seven left in the family.

They were camping all by themselves when they were attacked by the Tonkawas, those man-eaters. Four of them were killed, and the mother and two of her children were captured.

After a year had passed, the Tonkawas decided they wanted peace with the Comanches, so they sent thirty warriors to escort the woman back to the tribe.

When they came to Comanche territory, they made a camp, and a Tonkawa chief and one warrior set out with the woman to look for the Comanches.

A Comanche war party, including some Kiowas, met them on a hill top. The Tonkawa signaled for friendship, so the Comanche leader came right up and shook hands before anything was said. The woman was glad. "This is what the Tonkawas want," she said.

[32] Informant: That's It.

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While they were talking, some of the Comanche and Kiowa warriors drifted on and found the Tonkawa camp. The group on the hill heard a shot fired.

"Well, it's too late," said the Tonkawa chief, and he whirled his horse and rode off. The Comanche woman, who had become his wife, took a spear and scattered the Comanches. Thus the Tonkawa chief got away.

They started a general fight right then, the Tonkawas beat up that Comanche-Kiowa war party that day. They chased the Comanches a long way.

One Tonkawa was outstanding. The brother of Eagle Tail Feather shot his horse, but he was not hurt. » » »

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The Comanches seldom took the initiative at treaty-making with the whites; rather, it was the whites. In later days the preliminary procedure in getting the Comanches to make a treaty was about as follows: An agent acting under orders from Washington decided that a treaty was desirable. He then went into the Comanche country to visit with as many of the bands as he could locate. He told them that the "Big Chief" wanted to make peace and be friendly with them; that he hoped to see them at a certain time and place, probably in the vicinity of a trading house. He made a number of promises, gave a few presents, and got some Indian messengers to carry the news to other bands and tribes. If the chiefs promised to come in, and some nearly always would agree, preparations were made on a grand scale for the assembly.

Quantities of beads, hatchets, mirrors, fine combs, matches, cloth, and other articles which the Indians desired or needed were provided. A company of soldiers was sent along (in Texas, Texas Rangers, if available), commissioners to make the treaty, and the agents. By the date set, the council ground was alive with activity, but most of the time the only Indians present were those who hoped by their early arrival to secure more than their share of the spoils. A Comanche seldom kept an appointment on time; to do so sacrificed a measure of his independence. Some of the Comanche bands would not appear at all, because they had no confidence in the white man's treaties or in their own ability to achieve a diplomatic victory over

3:Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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them in council. An agent might work for months to bring the Indians into council and have all his efforts thwarted by a wild rumor set afloat by some unscrupulous trader. The Indians who did come were fully armed and dressed in all their war paraphernalia and paint. Both the white and the red men tried to make as formidable an appearance as possible to impress the other. The Comanches usually maneuvered in such a way as to make a test of the good faith of the white man. Some Comanches failed to show up for fear of the intentions of the whites. *Huwia,* who was a medicine man, was instructed to go to Fort Sill to attend a council to be held with an army officer. He was afraid to go, because he feared a trap, and *Tsi:vas* went in his stead. The People then elevated *Tsi:vas* to the chieftainship for which *Huwia* had been in line.

Dealing with the whites on other than a war footing taxed all the abilities of the Comanches. Bull Elk (*patuwa ɬum*), who was the top war chief of the Antelope band, turned his chieftainship over to Wild Horse and Black Mustache when the Comanches were placed on the reservation. He said he did not know how to deal with the white man.[33]

Finally, when all was ready, the council convened for business. Matters were conducted with much gravity, on the part of the white men in order to impress the Indians, and on the part of the Indians because gravity in council was in keeping with their nature. The chiefs, commissioners, and other officials seated themselves in a circle. Behind stood the respective warriors of each group, fully armed. The peace pipe was ceremoniously lighted and passed around the circle from lip to lip in silence. After it had made the round, the commissioner or agent made a talk in which he stated the purpose of the council, reminded the Indian that he had been making depredations upon the white people, expressed his love for the red man, and made known the overwhelming power of the Great Father. Then the Indians were urged to state their side of the case and to tell the whole truth. If they had been wronged by the white man, the commissioners wished to know it, and if they themselves had committed acts of hostility, they were to confess.

Then the Indians spoke, always with simplicity and often with

[33] Informant: Eagle Tail Feather.

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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X 648 728 impressive eloquence and beauty. (Knowing that they would likely have to speak in public council at some time, the Comanches had trained themselves to speak well. Before delivering a speech, if there were opportunity, the speaker spent much time in preparation and rehearsal.) He represented himself as a man of peace, but he made it understood that he wanted no encroachment of either red men or white men upon the vast expanse of territory south of the Arkansas River which he considered his own. He did not want it disfigured by soldiers' camps and "medicine homes." His country was small enough already. There was time enough to consider reservations and the building of homes when the buffalo were gone, and there were plenty of buffalo if only enough to supply the Indians' needs were killed. As to trusting to the agents for food, he had no confidence in that. He called attention to the "white" Indians, those who had come in contact with the whites and had made treaties in accord with white man's wishes. Formerly they had been powerful, but now they were weak and poor. He had little respect for them, for "They are an old dirty, inefficient-looking set, hardly capable of managing their own affairs," who had degenerated to the point where the Comanches had no desire to associate with them. The speech of Ten Bears, of the Ute peace episode, who spoke for the Comanches at the Council of Medicine Lodge Creek in 1867, may well be given in full, not only because it presented the case of the Comanche well and forcibly, but also because it is a masterpiece of oratory that would be a credit to one trained in the classroom.

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> My heart is filled with joy when I see you here, as the brooks fill with water when the snows melt in the spring; and I feel glad as the ponies do when the fresh grass starts in the beginning of the year. I heard of your coming when I was many sleeps away, and I made but few camps before I met you. I knew that you had come to do good to me and to my people. I looked for benefits which would last forever, and so my face shines with joy as I look upon you. My people have never first drawn a bow or fired a gun against the whites. There has been trouble on the line between us, and my young men have danced the war dance. But it was not begun by us. It was you who sent out the first soldier

3: Wallace & Hoebel E-4, 5 (1933, 1945) 1952
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and we who sent out the second. Two years ago, I came upon this road, following the buffalo, that my wives and children might have their cheeks plump and their bodies warm. But the soldiers fired on us, and since that time there has been a noise like that of a thunderstorm, and we have not known which way to go. So it was upon the Canadian. Nor have we been made to cry once alone. The blue-dressed soldiers and the Utes came from out of the night when it was dark and still, and for camp-fires they lit our lodges. Instead of hunting game they killed my braves, and the warriors of the tribe cut short their hair for the dead.

So it was in Texas. They made sorrow come in our camps, and we went out like the buffalo bulls when the cows are attacked. When we found them we killed them, and their scalps hang in our lodges. The Comanches are not weak and blind, like the pups of a dog when seven sleeps old. They are strong and far-sighted, like grown horses. We took their road and we went on it. The white women cried and our women laughed.

But there are things which you have said to me which I do not like. They were not sweet like sugar, but bitter like gourds. You said that you wanted to put us upon a reservation, to build us houses and make us medicine lodges. I do not want them. I was born upon the prairie, where the wind blew free and there was nothing to break the light of the sun. I was born where there were no enclosures and everything drew a free breath. I want to die there and not within walls. I know every stream and every wood between the Río Grande and the Arkansas. I have hunted and lived over that country. I live like my fathers before me and like them I lived happily.

When I was at Washington the Great Father told me that all the Comanche land was ours, and that no one should hinder us in living upon it. So, why do you ask us to leave the rivers, and the sun, and the wind, and live in houses? Do not ask us to give up the buffalo for the sheep. The young men have heard talk of this, and it has made them sad and angry. Do not speak of it more. I love to carry out the talk I get from the Great Father. When I get goods and presents, I and my people feel glad, since it shows that he holds us in his eye.

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The Comanches

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If the Texans had kept out of my country, there might have been peace. But that which you now say we must live in, is too small. The Texans have taken away the places where the grass grew the thickest and the timber was the best. Had we kept that, we might have done the things you ask. But it is too late. The whites have the country which we loved, and we only wish to wander on the prairie until we die. Any good thing you say to me shall not be forgotten. I shall carry it as near to my heart as my children, and it shall be as often on my tongue as the name of the Great Spirit. I want no blood upon my land to stain the grass. I want it all clear and pure, and I wish it so that all who go through among my people may find peace when they come in and leave it when they go out.[34]

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After both the Indians and the whites had talked too much and told a good many lies along with a great deal of truth, the treaty would be drawn and signed by the white men. The Indians made a mark opposite their names, which were phonetically written, after a fashion, by the white men. Yet there is no evidence to indicate that the Comanches were ever convinced that it was best for them to sign. Presents were distributed and the council ended. The Comanches returned to their buffalo tipis and the whites to their cabin homes, but neither had any confidence that the other would do what had been promised.

[34] Ten Bears, Comanche chief, "Speech," October 20, 1867, "Record Copy of the Proceedings of the Indian Peace Commission Appointed under the Act of Congress Approved July 20, 1867" (MS, National Archives, Office of Indian Affairs, Washington), I, 104.

11: Casagrande E,L-5 (1940) 1954
NO6 Comanche NO6
Oklahoma

175 This dark picture of conflict is tempered
648 somewhat by the fact that the Comanche were admitted to the Taos fair in 1748 or 1749 and attended again in 1751[16]—the documents left by the military men and governors would tend to minimize these more peaceable events. In 1776, Anza, the governor of New Mexico, inaugurated a military campaign against the Comanche and sought them out in their own country northeast of New Mexico. In 1779 the Comanche received their first major defeat at Spanish hands near what is now Pueblo,
[728] Colorado. Peace was soon established and, after a formal treaty was negotiated in 1786, relations with the Spanish became
[439] more cordial. Comanche came to the Pueblo of Santa Fe and Pecos in great numbers, and Comanchéros,[17] as the traders from the New Mexican settlements were known, visited them frequently. Ugarte, Commander General of the Interior Provinces of New Spain from 1785 to 1790, suggested as a device to foster better relations that the children of Comanche chiefs be sent to Mexico City to learn the Spanish language and culture. Anza founded the village of San Carlos de los Jupes in 1787 on the Arkansas River in Colorado[18] in an abortive attempt to establish an agricultural colony of Comanche. Artisans built houses and farmers were sent to teach the Comanche to farm, but they would not become good Pueblo Indians and the project soon failed. Anza's governorship marked the most tranquil period of Comanche-Spanish relations, and after 1800 they deteriorated rapidly.

As early as 1724 a French explorer,
[439] Bourgmont, had made contact with the Comanche in what is now Kansas. He observed that they had horses which they said

[113] [16] A. B. Thomas, The Plains Indians and New
Mexico, p. 6 (Glendale, Calif., 1940).
[113] [17] J. E. Haley, The Comanchero Trade, Southwestern Historical Quarterly, 38.157-76 (1935).
[113] [18] A. B. Thomas, San Carlos: A Comanche Pueblo on the Arkansas River, 1787, Colorado Magazine, 6:79-91 (Denver, Colo., 1929).

[p. 143-A]

Comanche attacks against the New Mexican settlements continued, but at the same time the Indians were developing a new interest in trade. Their activities on the plains had netted them considerable surplus wealth in hides, jerked meat, Apache and Pawnee slaves, and horses. 175 439 [721]

The logical outlets for these were the trading fairs held annually in the pueblos of Taos and Pecos. The fairs occurred in September when the farming Indians had the fruits of their fields to offer for barter, and making the events even more attractive were the growing numbers of Spanish goods which were finding their way into the market place. The Comanches thus found it convenient to suspend hostilities for the weeks that the trading was in progress and to enter the pueblos under a flag of truce. Such an arrangement was acceptable to the Spaniards since they looked upon the fairs as providing a useful opportunity to try to convince their enemy to accept a year around peace. 175 439 728 648

The friendly but brief contacts which the Comanches had with the New Mexicans at the fairs in no way, however, deterred them from undertaking raids against the settlements at other seasons of the year. These became particularly devastating in the decades following 1750, as the Comanches extended the range of their attacks into the central and southern portions of the province. By mid-century the Comanches had broken the alliance with their old friends the Utes and in pushing that tribe back into the mountains, they became for the time being the dominant people on the southern Plains. 175 721 648

The Comanche threat to New Mexico became tru- [727]

175 ly alarming as suggested by a report of 1751 which
721 claimed 500 Pueblo Indians and Spanish colonists
648 had been massacred up to that date. When the In-
727 dians numbering several hundred fell on Pecos Pueblo in the summer of this same year, the Spaniards organized a pursuit force and retaliated by surprising the Comanches in their camp, killing 101, and taking the remainder prisoner. Although victories such
175 as this were uncommon, the New Mexican colonists,
721 having realized the gravity of their problems, were
648 more willing to tighten their defenses and join with protective or punitive expeditions at a moment's notice.

Unfortunately, the stiffened resistance merely sharpened the challenge for the Comanche warrior who thrived on danger. So, far from diminishing, the Indian offenses against New Mexico continued
175 to increase in number and severity. In 1774, for ex-
701 ample, almost a thousand warriors devastated the Tewa district north of Santa Fe. If this figure for
[648] their fighting force is accurate, it strongly suggests
[721] that the Comanches, since moving onto the plains
[161] and adapting to horse culture and buffalo hunting, had experienced something of a population explosion. At the end of the century, General Pedro de Nava estimated 2,000 warriors for the Eastern Comanches and 4,000 for the Western.

175 The Spaniards won minor victories now and then,
648 but by the 1770's the Comanches had acquired fire-
[721] arms in quantity so that they were an even more
[411] formidable enemy. Nevertheless Governor Juan
[728] Bautista de Anza in 1785 succeeded in summoning a peace council composed of the leading chiefs of

the several Comanche bands which resided on the the eastern limits of New Mexico. 175 648 728

Anza was aided in his task by the immense prestige he enjoyed among the Indians. His reputation he owed to the destruction of a large Comanche camp in southeastern Colorado in 1779 and to the slaying at the same time of the prominent war chief Cuerno Verde. Governor Anza, in fact, succeeded in establishing peace with the Comanches by February of 1786 and at the same time in enlisting their aid in the continuing struggle with hostile Apaches in the south.

At the peace gathering were represented the principal bands of the Western Comanches, including the Yamparikas, and Yupes or Jupes, who were probably identical with the group known later as the Kwaharis. Some members of another band, the Kotsotekas, often called Cuchanticas or Cuchanecs, were also present. The Spaniards themselves during the last quarter of the eighteenth century were uncertain as to the divisions within the tribe. For example, the authorities in Texas usually considered the Kotsotekas as Eastern Comanches (*Orientales*) along with the Penatekas or Honey-Eaters (known to the Anglo-Americans later as the Wasp Band). 175 648 728 101 175 101

The Western Comanches, who agreed to terminate hostilities against the Spanish, followed a suggestion of Governor Anza and selected one of their number, Ecueracapa or Leather Jacket, to serve as head chief with authority to speak for the tribe. To increase his stature, the Spaniards bestowed upon Ecueracapa the lofty title of "General of the Comanche Nation." As a further inducement to remain at peace, 175 728 648 [643] [431]

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648 the Spanish government through the viceroy in
728 Mexico City authorized an annual distribution of
[431] gifts to the Comanches to be paid for by a special fund created for that purpose.

There were, in truth, a number of cogent reasons why the warlike Comanches were willing to accept Anza's offer of peace in 1786, quite apart from the
[721] elaborate gifts which were to be forthcoming. In the first place, their raids against New Mexico in the 1770's had proved so devastating that the impoverished province, at least for the time being, had little
[164] to offer them. Moreover, a severe smallpox epidemic that had visited most of western North America in 1780-1781 had taken its toll among the Comanches, leaving the tribe greatly weakened for a number of years thereafter. Finally, the Comanches were continuing their drift toward the south and east so that the focus of their attention was moving away from New Mexico and toward the settlements of Texas, Coahuila, and Chihuahua.

Not so understandable is why the Eastern Comanches or Orientales were led to accept peace terms at about the same time as their kinsmen to the west. Apparently, the overriding consideration in this case was the hatred felt toward the Lipan Apaches, against whom the Orientales now joined with the Spanish in common cause. [See Document I].

The peace established in 1785-1786 with both the Eastern and Western Comanches relieved the settled frontier of serious attacks from this tribe for almost a generation and was one of the few notable achievements registered by Spain in her dealings with the Indians of the northern frontier during the eight-

14 [See Category 175, pp. 21-22--Analyst.]

eenth century. Although the Comanches resumed their attacks on the upper Rio Grande Valley in the following century, these were never as damaging as the blows which had fallen on the province in the years immediately prior to the treaties.

After independence from Spain, when New Mexico was a remote province of the Mexican Republic, the intensity of Comanche incursions increased somewhat—Pecos Pueblo was reduced to utter ruin by 1838—but on the whole the raiders concentrated more heavily on the towns and villages of northern Mexico.

Comanches, traveling in parties as large as 500 and fully organized under their own officers, annually laid waste entire districts as far south as Fresnillo and Zacatecas. A well-defined road appeared—the Great Comanche War Trail—which led from the high plains of Texas across the Big Bend of the Río Grande to strike at the mining communities and haciendas from Durango southward, and according to some reports, as far west as the Gulf of California.

The anxious citizens kept lookouts constantly in the field to give warning of the Comanche approach. Once the alarm had been sounded, settlers, and peones with their families fled to the security of strongly fortified haciendas in somewhat the same manner as the peasants of medieval Europe must have sought refuge in castles from warrior Vikings.

Rather strong evidence suggests that the Comanches during several decades of friendly contact with the Spaniards in New Mexico through observation had learned much concerning the European military system and tactics and had adapted these to their own service.

13: Simmons H-4 (no date) 1967 NO6 Comanche NO6
(1785-1819) New Mexico

Document One

TREATY WITH THE EASTERN COMANCHES, October, 1785, from the report of Pedro de Nava Commandant General of the Interior Provinces, Chihuahua, July 23, 1799.

THE COMANCHES are divided in three branches or tribes known by the names Jupe, Yamparicas, and Cuchanec, or Cuchihantica. The first two inhabit the frontier of New Mexico, and the third, that of Texas. At almost the same time, peace was arranged in both Provinces with this numerous and warlike nation; and the terms settled upon in October of 1785 with the eastern tribe were the following:

1st That hostilities should cease on both sides, and that in whatever place Spaniards and Comanches might meet, they should treat each other as brothers and good friends.

2nd That the preceding condition is understood to apply not only to the inhabitants of Texas but to all the vassals of the King.

3rd That they should return our captives which they took for ransom, ceasing to engage in such acts against any nation.

4th That they should not admit into their camps any strangers, unless they suppose them to be traders who provide them with merchandise in exchange for hides.

[1785-1799]

175 5th That they should be friends and enemies to those
648 who are ours.
●728 6th That they should declare as their enemies, the Lipan Apaches and that whenever the Comanches attack them, some of them should come to [San Antonio de] Bexar to advise us of the results.

7th That they should request the license of the Governor of Texas when they intend to transfer themselves to the frontier of the Province of Coahuila for the purpose of making war on the Lipan Apaches and the Mescaleros.

8th And that each year a gift should be given to the captains and Indian leaders of the Comanches as a proof and as a manifestation of our good friendship.

Some of the Eastern Comanches have broken away from the main group and have created small disorders and have perpetrated robberies, but without the knowledge of the captains or other Indian leaders of that nation, who themselves have continued to observe in an acceptable manner the conditions of peace since the time of the agreement.

Pedro de Nava

23: Cabello y Robles G-3 (1778-1786) 1961
NO6 Comanche NO6
Eastern Comanche

[ca. 1786]

aforesaid chiefs has been by election and vote of all the Eastern Nation; [the two chiefs] having [already] made themselves very distinguished in the encounters of war with their enemies, by which they gained the esteem of all their Nation and the following which they have; in the councils that they hold, always their vote decides, and the rest of the Nation does not oppose them.

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EIGHTH: What Is the Personal Chafacter of These Chiefs and the Influence That They Have, and Are Able to Have in the Negotiations of the Nation?

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As the two great captains previously mentioned have not come to this presidio of San Antonio de Béxar, the governor has not been able to learn their character, but if the experiences of the six lesser captains that have come to the ratification of the peace treaties [are a basis for judging], they are of a generous spirit and have manifested more friendliness to the Spaniards than the captains of the other friendly Nations of the North. It has been observed that the retinue of the chiefs [of the Nations of the North] look at the [Comanche] chiefs with more respect and give them more subordination than they do their own chiefs.

[728]

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With respect to the rest of the observations that the governor has made of this nation, he has come to understand that it is necessary to treat them with much friendliness and consistency, for they are, in short, of a very sensitive nature and do not accommodate themselves to any harshness. Without compromising the dignity of his office, it is indispensible [that the governor] manifest toward them all love, and make them believe in the governor, for them to behave satisfactorily toward [the Spaniards]; for if they begin to lack confidence, they take many precautions and manifest their vexation; in virtue of which it is necessary that a governor of the Province of Texas, whom they call Father, have the gravest finesse and precautions in dealing with the said Indians, in order to keep them always

175 648 181 175 648

28: Thomas H-4 (no date) 1962 NO6 Comanche NO6
(1786)

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C and detachment of one hundred and fourteen men
D Apache whom he killed by his own hand
E two wounds which he received
F[11] Two other Apache killed in the battle
G two prisoners
H Forty horses and twenty she-mules which he took from them
K Chief Salambipu with his lance and detachment of eighty-eight men
L Two dead Apache[12]
I twenty riding beasts recaptured[13]
M Six wounded Comanche,[14] one of whom died
N Chief Encajive with his lance and party of fifty men
O A dead Apache
P a wounded Comanche
Q Chief Piaquegipe with his lance commanding sixty-four men, whose party, farthest west, produced no result, as it was seen by the enemy.

NOTE

Neither the report of the Governor nor the explanation which Oxamaguea gave him explained this sign f. It is believed that it indicates the individuals who without being chiefs won some distinction.

NOTICIA

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Information (Noticia) concerning the Comanche chiefs present in the Villa of Santa Fé and Pueblo of Pecos in the year of 86 until the 14th of July, to treat for the purpose of adjusting the peace celebrated with Governor Don Juan Bautista de Anza with a statement of the number of tents, which each one has under his command, in which there may be computed about three men of arms and from seven to eight women and children.

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found. It is not impossible, in fact it is quite likely, that such an account exists in Spanish archives. On the use of *sable*, see *Diccionario de la Langua Castellana extraido del Diccionario Enciclopedico* compuesto por E. Zerolo, M. de Toro y Gomez, E. Isaza. The example given by the authors there is: "Usaran de las espadas o *sables* los oficiales. (Orden Mil.)." [113]

[11] The Spanish copyist wrote a sequence of EF for two F's, as may be seen in the copy of this Tally Sheet accompanying the Relacion (see footnote 4 above).

[12] Garrick Mallery, Picture Writing of the American Indians, illustration opposite page 574, shows dead Sioux on their heads, whereas these are shown here heads up in D, F, L, and o. Prisoners, on the other hand, are indicated with heads down in G. [171]

[13] The reproduction here has the familiar horseshoes marks in H, I, by which horses are commonly indicated in Plains pictographic art. Inasmuch as horses and mules are definitely indicated in H, the animals indicated in I, referred to as *cavallerias*, and drawn much smaller, might be donkey pack animals. The word *cavallerias* (eighteenth century Spanish for *caballerias*) means riding beasts, though the word in eighteenth century documents is frequently used to refer to the whole horse herd. [171]

[14] The wounded Comanche are indicated by what appears to be broken lances.